How the Law of Excluded Middle Pertains to the Second Incompleteness
  Theorem and its Boundary-Case Exceptions by Willard, Dan E.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
01
05
7v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
 Ju
n 2
02
0
How the Law of Excluded Middle Pertains to the
Second Incompleteness Theorem and its
Boundary-Case Exceptions
Dan E.Willard
State University of New York at Albany
Abstract
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partial exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem where
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1 Introduction
This article is intended to explore the “hidden significance” and unexplored implica-
tions of Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem and its various generalizations. In
particular, the existence of a deep chasm separating the goals of Hilbert’s consistency
program from the implications of the Second Incompleteness Theorem was evident,
immediately, after Go¨del published [20]’s seminal announcement. We exhibited in
[46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54] a large number of articles about generalizations and
boundary case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem, starting with our
1993 article [46]. These papers, which included six papers published in the JSL and
APAL, showed every extension α of Peano Arithmetic can be mapped onto an axiom
system α∗ that can recognize its own consistency and prove analogs of all α’s Π1
theorems (in a slightly different language, called L∗).
The term “Self-Justifying” arithmetic was employed in our articles. [47, 50, 51,
52, 54]. These papers were able to verify their own consistency by containing a built-
in self-referencing axiom that declared “I am consistent” (as will be explained later).
In particular, our axiom systems α∗ used the Fixed-Point Theorem to assure α∗ ’s
self-referencing analogs of the pronoun “I” would enable it to refer to itself in the
context of its “I am consistent” axiomatic declaration.
It turns out that such a self-referencing mechanism will produce unacceptable
Go¨del-style diagonalizing contradictions, when either α∗ or its particular deployed
definition of consistency are too strong. This is because our methodologies only
become contradiction-free when α∗ uses sufficiently weak underlying structures.
These weak structures obviously have significant disadvantages. Their virtue is
that their formalisms α∗ can be arranged to prove more Π1 like theorems than Peano
Arithmetic, while offering some type of partial knowledge about their own consistency.
We will call such formalisms “Declarative Exceptions” to the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem.
An alternative type of exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem, which
we shall call an “Infinite-Ranged Exception”, was recently developed by Sergei
Artemov [4] (It is related to the works of Beklemishev [6] and Artemov-Beklemishev
[5].) Artemov observed Peano Arithmetic can verify its own consistency, from a
special infinite-ranging perspective. This means PA will generate an infinite set of
1
theorems T1, T2, T3 ... where each Ti shows some subset Si of PA is unable
to prove 0 = 1 and where PA equals the formal union of these special selected Si
satisfying the inclusion property of S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ S3 ⊂ ... .
This perspective, which is certainly very useful, is also not a panacea. Thus,
the abstract in [4] cautiously used the adjective of “somewhat” to describe how it
sought to partially achieve the goals sought by Hilbert’s Consistency Program (with
an infinite collection of theorems T1, T2, T3 ... replacing Hilbert’s intended goal of
finding one unifying formal consistency theorem).
Our “Declarative”’ exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem and Arte-
mov’s “Infinite Ranging” exceptions are two quite different rigorous results, which
are nicely compatible with each other. This is because each acknowledged that the
Second Incompleteness Theorem is a strong result, that will admit no full-scale ex-
ceptions. Also, these results are of interest because Go¨del openly conjectured that
Hilbert’s Consistency Program would ultimately, reach some levels of partial success
(see next section). We will explain, herein, how Go¨del’s conjecture can be partially
justified, due to an unusual consequence of the Law of the Excluded Middle.
More specifically, we shall focus on the semantic tableau deductive mechanisms
of Fitting and Smullyan [15, 40] and their special properties from the perspective of
our JSL-2005 article [50]. Each instance of the Law of the Excluded Middle has been
treated by most tableau mechanisms as a provable theorem, rather than as a built-in
logical axiom. This may, at first, appear to be an insignificant distraction because
most deductive methodologies do not have their consistency reversed when a theorem
is promoted into becoming a logical axiom.
Our self-justifying axiom systems are different, however, because their built-in
self-referencing “I am consistent” axioms have their meanings change, fundamentally,
when their self-referencing concept of “I” involves promoting a schema of theorems
verifying the Law of Excluded Middle into formal explicitly declared logical axioms.
This effect is counterintuitive because similar distinctions exist almost nowhere
else in Logic. Thus some confusion, that has surrounded our prior work, can be
clarified when one realizes that an interaction between the self-referencing concept
of “I” with the Law of Excluded Middle causes the Second Incompleteness Theorem
to become activated precisely when the Law of Excluded Middle is promoted into
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becoming a schema of logical axioms.
The intuitive reason for this unusual effect is that the transforming of derived
theorems into logical axioms can shorten proofs under the Fitting-Smullyan seman-
tic tableau technology. In the particular context where §3’s formalism uses self-
referencing “I am consistent” axioms and views multiplication as a 3-way relation-
ship, these conditions will be sufficient for enacting the full power of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem.
The next chapter will explain how these issues are related to questions raised by
Go¨del and Hilbert about feasible boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incomplete-
ness Effect.
2 Revisiting Some Intuitions of Go¨del and Hilbert
Interestingly, neither Go¨del (unequivocally) nor Hilbert (after learning about Go¨del’s
work) would dismiss the possibility of a compromise solution, whereby a fragment of
the goals of Hilbert’s Consistency Program would remain intact. Thus, Hilbert never
withdrew [26]’s statement ∗ for justifying his program:
∗ “ Let us admit that the situation in which we presently find ourselves with
respect to paradoxes is in the long run intolerable. Just think: in mathematics,
this paragon of reliability and truth, the very notions and inferences, as every-
one learns, teaches, and uses them, lead to absurdities. And where else would
reliability and truth be found if even mathematical thinking fails?”
Go¨del was, also, cautious (especially during the early 1930’s) not to speculate
whether all facets of Hilbert’s Consistency program would come to a termination. He
thus inserted the following cautious caveat into his famous 1931 paper [20]:
∗ ∗ “It must be expressly noted that Theorem XI” (e.g. the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem) “represents no contradiction of the formalistic standpoint
of Hilbert. For this standpoint presupposes only the existence of a consistency
proof by finite means, and there might conceivably be finite proofs which cannot
be stated in P or in ... ”
Several biographies of Go¨del [11, 22, 58] have noted that Go¨del’s intention (prior
to 1930) was to establish Hilbert’s proposed objectives, before he formalized his fa-
mous result that led in an opposite direction. Moreover, Yourgrau’s biography [58] of
Go¨del records how von Neumann found it necessary during the early 1930’s to “ar-
gue against Go¨del himself” about the definitive termination of Hilbert’s consistency
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program, which “for several years” after [20]’s publication, Go¨del “was cautious not
to prejudge”.
It is known that Go¨del hinted the Second Incompleteness Theorem was more sig-
nificant in a 1933 Vienna lecture [21]. Yet, Go¨del (who published only about 85 pages
during his career) was frequently ambivalent about this point. Thus, a YouTube talk
by Gerald Sacks [39] recalled Go¨del telling Sacks some type of revival of Hilbert’s
Consistency Program was likely (see footnote 1 for more details). Moreover, Anil
Nerode has told us [32] he recalled Stanley Tennenbaum having similar conversations
with Go¨del, where Go¨del again stated his suspicion that Hilbert’s Consistency Pro-
gram would be partially revived. Many scholars have been caught by surprise by
Go¨del’s private hesitation about the broader implications of the Second Incomplete-
ness Effect. This is because Go¨del only published roughly 85 pages during his career,
and he never publicly expanded upon [20]’s statement ** .
The research that followed Go¨del’s seminal 1931 discovery has technically focused
on studying mostly generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem (instead
of also examining its boundary-case exceptions). Many of these generalizations of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem [2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 23, 24, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51] are quite subtle.
The author of this paper is especially impressed by a generalization of the Second
Incompleteness Effect, arrived at by the combined work of Pudla´k and Solovay to-
gether with added research by Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [31, 36, 42, 45]. These results,
which have been further amplified in [10, 16, 23, 43, 47], show the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem does not require the presence of the Principle of Induction to apply to
most formalisms that use a Hilbert-Frege style of deduction.
The next chapter’s Remark 3.5 will helpfully summarize such generalizations of
the Second Incompleteness Effect.
1 Some quotes from Sacks’s YouTube talk [39] are that Go¨del “did not think” the objectives of
Hilbert’s Consistency Program “were erased” by the Incompleteness Theorem, and Go¨del believed
(according to Sacks) it left Hilbert’s program “very much alive and even more interesting than it
initially was”.
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3 Main Notation and Background Literature
Let us call an ordered pair (α,D) a Generalized Arithmetic Configuration (ab-
breviated as a “GenAC” ) when its first and second components are defined as
follows:
1. The Axiom Basis “ α ” for a GenAC is defined as its set of proper axioms.
2. The second component “D ” of a GenAC, called its Deductive Apparatus,
is defined as the union of its logical axioms “LD” with its rules for obtaining
inferences.
Example 3.1 This notation allows us to separate the logical axioms LD , as-
sociated with (α,D) , from its “basis axioms”, denoted as “α ”. It also allows us to
compare different deductive apparatuses from the literature. Thus, the DE appara-
tus, from Enderton’s textbook [12], uses only modus ponens as a rule of inference, but
it deploys a complicated 4-part schema of logical axioms. This differs from the DM
and DH apparatuses in the Mendelson [30] and Ha´jek-Pudla´k [25] textbooks. (They
used a more reduced set of logical axioms but employed “generalization” as a second
rule of inference.) In contrast, the DF apparatus, from Fitting’s and Smullyan’s
textbooks [15, 40], uses no logical axioms, but employs a broader “tableau style” rule
of inference. AN IMPORTANT POINT is that while proofs have different lengths
under different apparatuses, all the common apparatuses produce the same set of final
theorems from an initial common “axiom basis” of α (as footnote 2 explains).
Definition 3.2 Let α again denote an axiom basis, D designate a deduction
apparatus, and (α,D) denote their GenAC. Henceforth, the configuration (α,D) will
be called Self-Justifying when
i. one of (α,D)’s theorems (or possibly one of α’s axioms) states that the deduc-
tion method D, applied to the basis system α, produces a consistent set of
theorems, and
ii. the GenAC formalism (α,D) is actually, in fact, consistent.
2 This is because all the common apparatuses satisfy the requirements of Go¨del’s Completeness
Theorem.
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Example 3.3 Using Definition 3.2’s notation, our prior research [46, 47, 50, 51,
54] constructed GenAC pairs (α,D) that were “Self Justifying”. We also proved
that the Incompleteness Theorem implies specific limits beyond which self-justifying
formalisms simply cannot transgress. For any (α,D) , all our articles observed it was
easy to construct a system αD ⊇ α that satisfies the Part-i condition (in an isolated
context where the Part-ii condition is not also satisfied). In essence, αD could consist
of all of α ’s axioms plus the added “SelfRef(α,D)” sentence, defined below:
⊕ There is no proof (using D’s deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the
union of the axiom system α with this sentence “SelfRef(α,D) ” (looking
at itself).
Kleene [28] was the first to notice how to encode analogs of SelfRef(α,D) ’s above
statement, which we often call an “I AM CONSISTENT” axiom. Each of
Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [28, 38, 27] emphasized αD may be inconsistent (e.g.
violate Part-ii of self-justification’s definition despite the assertion in SelfRef(α,D)’s
particular statement). This is because if the pair (α,D) is too strong then a quite con-
ventional Go¨del-style diagonalization argument can be applied to the axiom basis of
αD = α+ SelfRef(α,D), where the added presence of the statement SelfRef(α,D)
will cause this extended version of α , ironically, to become automatically inconsis-
tent. Thus, an encoding for “SelfRef(α,D)” is relatively easy, via an application of
the Fixed Point Theorem, but this sentence is potentially devastating.
Definition 3.4 Let Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicates
specifying x + y = z and x ∗ y = z. (Obviously, arithmetic’s classic associative,
commutative, identity and distributive axioms will have Π1 encodings when they are
expressed using these two predicates.) We will say that a formalized axiom basis
system of α recognizes successor, addition and multiplication as Total Functions
iff it can prove all of (1) - (3) as theorems:
∀x ∃z Add(x, 1, z) (1)
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z) (2)
∀x ∀y ∃z Mult(x, y, z) (3)
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We will call the GenAC system (α,D) a Type-M formalism iff it proves (1) - (3) as
theorems, Type-A if it proves only (1) and (2), and it will be called Type-S if it
proves only (1) as a theorem. Also, (α,D) will be called Type-NS iff it can prove
none of (1) - (3).
Remark 3.5 The separation of GenAC systems into the categories of Type-NS,
Type-S, Type-A and Type-M systems helps summarize the prior literature about gen-
eralizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
This is because:
i. The combined research of Pudla´k, Solovay, Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [31, 36,
42, 45], as formalized by Theorem ++ , implies that no natural Type−S system
(α,D) can recognize its own consistency when D represents one of Example 3.1’s
three Hilbert-Frege deductive methods of DE , DH and DM . It thus establishes
the following result:
++ (Solovay’s modification [42] of Pudla´k [36]’s formalism using
some of Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [31, 45]’s methods) : Let (α,D)
denote a Type-S GenAC system which assures the successor operation
will provably satisfy both x′ 6= 0 and x′ = y′ ⇔ x = y. Then
(α,D) cannot verify its own consistency whenever simultaneously D
is some type of a Hilbert-Frege deductive apparatus and α treats
addition and multiplication as 3-way relations, satisfying their usual
associative, commutative, distributive and identity axioms.
Essentially, Solovay [42] privately communicated to us in 1994 an analog of
theorem ++. Many authors have noted Solovay has been reluctant to publish
his nice privately communicated results on many occasions [10, 25, 31, 34, 36,
45]. Thus, approximate analogs of ++ were explored subsequently by Buss-
Ignjatovic´, Ha´jek and Sˇvejdar in [10, 23, 43], as well as in Appendix A of our
paper [47] and in [49]. Also, Pudla´k’s initial 1985 article [36] captured the
majority of ++’s essence, chronologically before Solovay’s observations. Also,
Friedman did some closely related work in [16].
ii. Part of what makes ++ interesting is that [47, 50, 51] presented two types
of self-justifying GenAC systems, whose natural hybrid is precluded by ++.
Specifically, these results involve using Example 3.3’s self-referencing “I am
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consistent” axiom (from statement ⊕ ). Thus, they establish that some (not all)
Type-NS systems [47, 51] can verify their own consistency under a Hilbert-Frege
style deductive apparatus 3, and some (not all) Type-A systems [46, 47, 50, 52]
can, likewise, corroborate their consistency under a more restrictive semantic
tableau apparatus. Also, we observed in [48, 53] how one could refine ++
with Adamowicz-Zbierski’s methods [2] to show most Type-M systems cannot
recognize their semantic tableau consistency.
Remark 3.6 . Several of our papers, starting with our 1993 article [46], have
used Example 3.3’s “I am consistent” axiomatic declaration ⊕ for evading the
Second Incompleteness Effect. Other possible types of evasions rest on the cut-free
methods of Gentzen and Kreisel-Takeuti [19, 29], an interpretational approach (such
as what Adamowicz, Bigorajska, Friedman, Nelson, Pudla´k and Visser had applied
in [1, 17, 31, 36, 44]), or Artemov’s Infinite-Range perspective [4] (where an infinite
schema of theorems replaces one single unified consistency theorem). We encourage
the reader to examine all these articles, each of which has their own separate merits.
Our focus, in this paper, will be primarily on the next section’s Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.
They show that some partial (and not full) evasions of the Second Incompleteness
Effect can arise under a semantic tableau deductive apparatus.
4 Main Theorems and Related Notation
A function F is called Non-Growth when F (a1, . . . , aj) ≤ Maximum(a1, . . . , aj)
holds. Six examples of non-growth functions are:
1. Integer Subtraction (where x− y is defined to equal zero when x ≤ y ),
2. Integer Division (where x÷y equals x when y = 0, and it equals ⌊ x/y ⌋ otherwise),
3. Maximum(x, y),
4. Log♠ (x) which is an abbreviation for ⌈ Log2( x + 1 ) ⌉ under the conventional
notation. (The footnote 4 explains the significance of this concept.)
3 The Example 3.1 had provided three examples of Hilbert-Frege style deduction operators, called
DE , DH and DM . It explained how these deductive operators differ from a tableau-style deductive
apparatus by containing a modus ponens rule.
4 The Ha´jek-Pudla´k textbook [25] uses the notation “ | x | ” to designate what we shall call
“ Log♠ (x) ” Thus for x ≥ 1 , Log♠ (x) denotes the number of symbols that will encode the
number x , when it is written in a binary format.
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5. Root(x, y) = ⌈x1/y ⌉ , and also
6. Count(x, j) which designates the number of physical “1” bits that are stored among
x’s rightmost j bits.
Our papers used the term Grounding Function to refer to these six non-growth
operations. Also, the term U-Grounding Function referred to a function that
corresponds to either one of these six grounding primitives or the growth-oriented
functional operations of Addition and Double(x) = x+ x.
Our language L∗, defined in [50], was built out of the eight U-Grounding function
operations plus the primitives of “0”, “1”, “= ” and “≤ ”. This language differs
from a conventional arithmetic by excluding a formal multiplication function symbol.
(Instead, it treats multiplication as a 3-way relation, via the obvious employment of
its Division primitive.) This notation leads to a surprisingly strong and tempting
evasion of the Second Incompleteness Effect.
Definition 4.1 In a context where t is any term in our language L∗, the special
quantifiers used in the wffs ∀ v ≤ t Ψ(v) and ∃ v ≤ t Ψ(v) will be called bounded
quantifiers. Also, any formula in our language L∗, all of whose quantifiers are so
bounded, will be called a ∆∗0 formula. The Π
∗
n and Σ
∗
n formulae are, thus, defined by
the usual rules, EXCEPT they DO NOT contain multiplication function symbols.
These rules are that:
1. Every ∆∗0 formula will also be a “ Π
∗
0 ” and “ Σ
∗
0 ” formula.
2. A wff will be called Π∗n when it is encoded as ∀v1 ... ∀vk Φ with Φ being Σ
∗
n−1.
3. A wff will be called Σ∗n when it is encoded as ∃v1..∃vk Φ, with Φ being Π
∗
n−1.
Remark 4.2 . A sentence Ψ will be called Rank-1* when it can be encoded
as either a Π∗1 or Σ
∗
1 sentence. Our definitions for Π
∗
1 or Σ
∗
1 formulae will differ from
Arithmetic’s conventional counterparts by excluding multiplication function symbols.
(This issue will turn out to be central to our evasions of the Second Incompleteness
Effect.)
There will be three variants of formal deductive apparatus methods, which we will
compare. The first is semantic tableau. It will receive an abbreviated name of “Tab”
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and correspond to Fitting’s textbook formalism [15]. (Its definition can also be found
in the attached Appendix.) Thus, a Tab-proof for a theorem Ψ, from an axiom basis
α, is a tree-structure that begins with the sentence ¬ Ψ stored inside the tree’s
root and whose every root−to−leaf path establishes a contradiction by containing
some pair of contradictory nodes that will “close” its path. The rules for generating
internal nodes, along each root−to−leaf path, are that each node must be either a
proper axiom of α or a deduction from an ancestor node via one of the Appendix’s
stated “elimination” rules for the ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∀, and ∃ symbols.
Our second explored deductive apparatus is called Extended Tableau, and shall be
abbreviated as “Xtab”. Its definition is identical to Tab-deduction, except that for
any sentence φ in our language L∗, the sentence φ ∨ ¬φ is allowed as an internal node
in an Xtab proof tree. (In other words, Xtab-deduction differs from Tab-deduction
by allowing all instances of the Law of Excluded Middle to appear as permitted
logical axioms. In contrast, Tab-deduction will view these instances only as derived
theorems.)
Our third deductive apparatus was called Tab-1 in [50]. It is, essentially, a com-
promise between Tab and Xtab, where a “Tab-1” proof for Ψ from an axiom basis α
corresponds to a set of ordered pairs (p1, φ1), (p2, φ2), ...., (pk, φk) where
1. φk = Ψ
2. Each pj is a Tab-proof of what we have called a Rank-1* sentence φj from
the union of α with the preceding Rank-1* sentences of φ1, φ2, ...., φj−1 .
The Rank-1* constraint ( defined by Remark 4.2 and utilized by the above Item
2) is significant. This is because Tab-1 deduction is less efficient than Xtab when
the former requires φj be a Rank-1* sentence. (In contrast, Xtab does not impose a
similar Rank-1* requirement upon φ when its Law of the Excluded Middle allows
φ ∨ ¬φ to appear anywhere as a permissible logical axiom, for fully arbitrary φ. )
Thus, Xtab is more desirable than Tab-1 when it can actually be feasibly (?) employed.
Let us say an axiom system α owns a Level-1 appreciation of its own self-
consistency (under a deductive apparatus D) iff it can verify that D produces no
two simultaneous proofs for a Π∗1 sentence and its negation. Within this context,
where β denotes any basis axiom system using L∗ ’s U-Grounding language, ISD(β)
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was defined in [50] to be an axiomatic formalism capable of recognizing all of β’s Π∗1
theorems and corroborating its own Level-1 consistency under D’s deductive appara-
tus. It consists of the following four groups of axioms:
Group-Zero: Two of the Group-zero axioms will define the constant-symbols, c¯0
and c¯1, designating the integers of 0 and 1. The Group-zero axioms will also
define the growth functions of Addition and Double(x) = x + x. (They will
enable our formalism to define any integer n ≥ 2 using fewer than 3 · ⌈Log n ⌉
logic symbols.)
Group-1: This axiom group will consist of a finite set of Π∗1 sentences, denoted as
F , which can prove any ∆∗0 sentence that holds true under the standard model
of the natural numbers. (Any finite set of Π∗1 sentences F , with this property,
may be used to define Group-1, as [50] had noted.)
Group-2: Let pΦq denote Φ’s Go¨del Number, and HilbPrfβ(pΦq, p) denote a ∆
∗
0
formula indicating that p is a Hilbert-Frege styled proof of theorem Φ from
axiom system β. For each Π∗1 sentence Φ, the Group-2 schema will contain the
below axiom (4). (Thus ISD(β) can trivially prove all β’s Π
∗
1 theorems.)
∀ p { HilbPrfβ(pΦq, p) ⇒ Φ } (4)
Group-3: The final part of ISD(β) will be a self-referencing Π
∗
1 axiom, that indicates
ISD(β) is “Level-1 consistent” under D’s deductive apparatus. It thus amounts
to the following declaration:
# No two proofs exist for a Π∗1 sentence and its negation, when D’s
deductive apparatus is applied to an axiom system, consisting of the
union of Groups 0, 1 and 2 with this sentence (looking at itself).
One encoding for # as a self-referencing Π∗1 axiom, had appeared in [50]. Thus,
Line (5) is a Π∗1 representation for # when:
a. Prf ISD(β)(a, b) is a ∆
∗
0 formula indicating that b is a proof of a theorem
a from the axiom basis ISD(β) under D’s deductive apparatus, and
b. Pair(x, y) is a ∆∗0 formula indicating that x is a Π
∗
1 sentence and y
represents x ’s negation.
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∀ x ∀ y ∀ p ∀ q ¬ [ Pair(x, y) ∧ Prf ISD(β)(x, p) ∧ Prf ISD(β)(y, q) ] (5)
For the sake of brevity, we will not provide exact details about how Line (5) can be
encoded under the Fixed Point Theorem. Adequate details are provided in [47, 50].
Definition 4.3 Let “D” denote any one of the Tab, Xtab or Tab-1 deductive
apparatus. Then we will say that the resulting mapping of ISD( • ) is Consistency
Preserving iff ISD(β) is automatically consistent whenever all the axioms of β hold
true under the standard model of the natural numbers.
The preceding definition raises questions about whether the mappings of ISTab( • ),
ISTab−1 ( • ), and ISXtab( • ) are consistency preserving. It turns out that Theorem 4.4
will show the first two of these mappings are consistency preserving, while Theorem
4.5 explores how the Law of the Excluded Middle conflicts with ISXtab( • )’s Group-3
axiom.
Theorem 4.4 The ISTab−1 ( • ) and ISTab( • ) mappings are consistency pre-
serving. (I.e. the axiom systems ISTab−1 (β) and ISTab(β) are automatically consistent
whenever all β’s axioms hold true under the standard model of the Natural Numbers.)
Theorem 4.5 In contrast, ISXtab( • ) fails to be a consistency-preserving map-
ping. (More specifically, ISXtab( β ) is automatically inconsistent whenever β proves
some conventional Π∗1 theorems stating that addition and multiplication satisfy their
usual associative, commutative, distributive and identity properties.)
The proofs of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 would be quite lengthy, if they were derived
from first principles. Fortunately, it is unnecessary for us to do so here because we
gave a detailed justification of Theorem 4.4’s result for ISTab−1 ( • ) in [50], and one
can incrementally modify the Remark 3.5’s special Invariant of ++ to justify Theorem
4.5. Thus, it will be possible for the next two sections of this paper to adequately
summarize the intuition behind Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, without delving into the full
formal details.
Part of the reason Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 are of interest is because of their sur-
prising contrast. Thus, some historians have wondered whether Hilbert and Go¨del
were entirely incorrect when their statements ∗ and ∗∗ suggested some form of the
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Consistency Program would likely be viable. Moreover Gerald Sacks’s YouTube talk
[39], as well as some added comments by Anil Nerode [32], have reinforced this point.
This is because Go¨del repeated analogs of ∗∗’s statement on several occasions, during
the later part of his career. Thus, the contrast between Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 provides
possible evidence that a fractional portion of what Hilbert and Go¨del had advocated,
might become feasible.
This paper will not have the page space to go into the full details, but the next
several sections will summarize the gist behind the proofs for Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.
5 Intuition Behind Theorem 4.4
Let us recall the acronym “Tab” stands for semantic tableau deduction. This was
defined by Fitting [14, 15] to be a tree-like proof of a theorem Ψ from an axiom
basis α , whose root consists of the temporary negated assumption of ¬ Ψ and
whose every root−to−leaf path establishes a contradiction by containing some pair
of contradictory nodes that “close” its path. Each internal node along these paths
must either be a proper axiom of α or be a deduction from an ancestor node via one
of the “elimination” rules associated with the logic symbols of ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∀, or ∃
(that are illustrated in the Appendix.)
Example 5.1 Let ISM
Tab
( • ) denote a mapping transformation identical to
Theorem 4.4’s formalism of ISTab( • ), except that IS
M
Tab
shall contain a further
multiplication function operation and, accordingly, have its Group-3 “I am consistent”
axiom statements updated to recognize multiplication as a total function. It turns
out this change will cause ISM
Tab
( • ) to stop satisfying the consistency-preservation
property, which Theorem 4.4 attributed to ISTab( • ).
The intuition behind this change can be roughly summarized if we let x0, x1, x2, ...
and y0, y1, y2, ... denote the sequences defined by:
x0 = 2 = y0 (6)
xi = xi−1 + xi−1 (7)
yi = yi−1 ∗ yi−1 (8)
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For i > 0 , let φi and ψi denote the sentences in (7) and (8) respectively. Also,
let φ0 and ψ0 denote (6)’s sentence. Then φ0, φ1, ... φn imply xn = 2
n+1 , and
ψ0, ψ1, ... ψn imply yn = 2
2n . Thus, the latter sequence shall grow at an exponen-
tially faster rate than the former. It turns out that this change in growth speed causes
the ISM
Tab
( • ), and ISTab( • ) to have quite opposite self-justification properties.
In particular, let the quantities Log( yn ) = 2
n and Log( xn ) = n+ 1 represent
the lengths for the binary codings for yn and xn . Thus, yn ’s coding will have a
length 2n , which is much larger than the n+1 steps of ψ0, ψ1, ... ψn (used to define
yn ’s existence). In contrast, xn ’s binary encoding will have a sharply smaller length
of size n + 1. These observations are significant because every proof establishing a
variant of the Second Incompleteness Effect involves a Go¨del number z encoding a
capacity to self-reference its own definition.
The faster growing series y0, y1, , ... yn should, intuitively, have this self-referencing
capacity because yn ’s binary encoding has a 2
n+1 length that greatly exceeds the
size of the O(n) steps used to define its value. Leaving aside many of [48, 53]’s further
details, this fast growth explains roughly why a Type-M logic, such as ISM
Tab
, satisfies
the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, unlike ISTab .
Our paradigm also explains why ISTab ’s Type-A formalism produces boundary-
case exceptions for the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness The-
orem. This is because [50] showed that it was unable to construct numbers z that
can self-reference their own definitions (when only the more slowly growing addition
primitive is available). In particular assuming only two bits are needed to encode
each sentence in the sequence φ0, φ1, ...φn , the length n+ 1 for xn’s binary encoding
is insufficient for encoding this sequence.
Leaving aside many of [50]’s details, this short length for xn explains the central
intuition behind [50]’s evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem under ISTab .
It arises essentially because of the sharp difference between the growth rates of the
two sequences of x1, x2, x3... and y1, y2, y3... .
There is obviously insufficient space for this extended abstract to provide more
details, here. A fully detailed proof of Theorem 4.4 is available in [50]. It establishes
(see 5 ) that Peano Arithmetic can prove β’s consistency implies both the consistency
5 The exact meaning of this implication is subtle. This is because Peano Arithmetic (PA)
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and also the self-justifying property of ISTab−1 (β).
Our more modest goal, within the present abbreviated paper, has been to merely
summarize the intuition behind Theorem 4.4’s surprising evasion of the Second In-
completeness Effect. It arises, intuitively, because of the striking difference in the
growth rates between the two series of x1, x2, x3... and y1, y2, y3... .
6 Summary of Theorem 4.5’s Proof
A formal proof of Theorem 4.5 is complex, but it can be nicely summarized. This is
because this proposition’s proof is similar to the formal justification for Remark 3.5’s
Invariant of ++ . (The latter’s insight has come from the combined work of Pudla´k,
Solovay, Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [36, 42, 31, 45]. It was, also, subsequently verified
by several other authors [10, 16, 23, 43, 47] in slightly different forms.)
The crucial aspect of the Hilbert-Frege deductive methodology is that its modus
ponens rule assures thar a proof of a theorem ψ from an axiom system α has a length
no more than proportional to the sum of the proof-lengths used to derive φ and
φ→ ψ . This “Linear-Sum Effect” does not apply also to Tab-deduction (because
the latter lacks a modus ponens rule).
The Xtab deductive methodology is , however, quite different from the Tab form
of deduction, in that only Xtab supports an analog of the prior paragraph’s “Linear-
Sum Effect”. This is because any node of an Xtab proof-tree is allowed to store any
sentence of the form φ ∨ ¬ φ (as a consequence of its allowed use of the Law of
Excluded Middle). This added feature will allow an Xtab proof for ψ to have a length
proportional to the sum of the proof lengths for φ and φ → ψ . In particular, such
an Xtab proof for ψ will consist of the following four steps:
1. The root of an Xtab proof for ψ consists of the usual temporary negated hy-
pothesis of ¬ψ (which the remainder of the proof tree will show is impossible
to hold).
CANNOT KNOW whether β is consistent when β = PA. Thus, unlike the quite different
formalism of ISTab−1 (PA) , the system of PA shall linger in a state of self-doubt, about whether
both PA and ISTab−1 (PA) are consistent. The main point is, however, that we humans believe
PA is consistent, and we can use this fact to confirm that ISTab−1 (PA) is BOTH consistent and
able to verify its self-consistency via its “I am consistent” axiom.
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2. The child of this root node consists of an allowed invocation of the Law of the
Excluded Middle of the particular form φ ∨ ¬φ .
3. The relevant Xtab proof tree will next employ the Appendix’s branching rule
for allowing the two sibling nodes of φ and ¬φ to descend from Item 2’s
node.
4. Finally, our Xtab proof will insert below (3)’s left sibling node of φ a subtree
that is no longer than a proof for φ → ψ , and likewise insert a proof for φ
below (3)’s right sibling of ¬ φ .
The point is that the very last step of the above 4-part proof has a length no
greater than the sum of the two proof lengths for φ and φ → ψ. (This is analogous
to the proof expansions resulting from a conventional modus ponens operation.) Its
first three steps will have entirely inconsequential effects that increase the overall
proof length by no more than a tiny amount, that is proportional to the trivial sum
of the lengths for the two individual sentences of “ φ ” and “ ψ ”.
Hence, the preceeding “Linear-Sum Effect” allows us to construct an analog of
Remark 3.5 ’s earlier Theorem + + for Xtab deduction. It is formalized by the
statement
⊙
below:
⊙
Any axiom system A is automatically inconsistent whenever it satisfies the following
three conditions:
I. A can verify Successor is a total function (as Line (1) formalized).
II. A can prove addition and multiplication (viewed as 3-way relations) satisfy their
usual associative, commutative, distributive and identity-operator properties.
III. A proves an added theorem (which turns out to be false) affirming its own
consistency when the Xtab deductive apparatus is used.
It is not possible to provide a short proof for statement
⊙
because it will
rest upon the very detailed “Definable Cut” machinery from pages 172-174 of the
Ha´jek-Pudla´k textbook [25]. The intuition behind
⊙
is, however, quite simple.
It is that statement
⊙
causes ++’s mechanism to generalize from Hilbert-Frege
deduction to Xtab (because both satisfy the Linear-Sum Effect).
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The nice aspect of
⊙
is that its machinery establishes Theorem 4.5. This
is because if β satisfies Theorem 4.5’s hypothesis then ISXtab(β) will satisfy
6 the
conditions I-III that cause ISXtab(β) to become inconsistent.
7 More Elaborate Forms of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5
Our results in Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate self-justifying methodologies apply
to “Tab”’, but not also “Xtab” deduction. (This is because Xtab treats the the Law
of Excluded Middle as a formal schema of logical axioms, and the latter activates the
power of the Second Incompleteness Effect.)
Our goal in this section will be to view this machinery in more meticulous de-
tail. Thus, we will explore at what exact juncture the boundary is crossed between
generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and its permissible exceptions.
Definition 7.1 Let L∗ again denote the base arithmetic language (that was de-
fined in §3 ), and Z denote an arbitrary set of sentences appearing in the language
L∗ (such as its set of Π∗2 sentences). Let us recall that the Appendix defined a semantic
tableau proof of a theorem Ψ from α’s axiom system. Then a Z-Enriched modifica-
tion for a semantic tableau proof of a theorem Ψ, from α’s set of proper axioms, will
be defined as the particular refinement of the Appendix’s proof-tree formalism that
allows Line (9) as an added permissible logical axiom, for any Υ ∈ Z.
Υ ∨ ¬ Υ (9)
Definition 7.2 It is also of interest to consider a slight modification of the pre-
ceeding nomenclature, where Z is a set of formulae that are allowed to be free in
the single variable of x (instead of representing a sentence that contains no free
variables). In this case, Υ(x) will designate a formula, within the subset of Z, and
Line (10) will replace Line (9) as the added permissible logical axiom that can be
allowed to appear inside a “Z-Base Variable Enriched” proof.
∀ x Υ(x) ∨ ¬ Υ(x) (10)
6Actually, ISXtab(β) will satisfy a requirement stronger than Item I because it recognizes addition
as a total function.
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A fully detailed justification will not be provided here, but it turns out our re-
sults from [47] can be expanded to show that their evasions of the semantic tableau
version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be extended to both the cases of
Z-Enriched and “Z-Base Variable Enriched” mechanisms, when Z represents the ∆∗0
class of formulae. We can also extend our results from [49] to show that the com-
parable evasions of the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness Effect
will fail at and above the Π∗2 level.
We conjecture the preceeding ∆∗0 evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
will continue at the Π∗1 level, but this fact has not yet been formally proven.
A fascinating aspect about this subject is that semantic tableau deduction satis-
fies its particular variant of Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem [15, 40]. Thus, the set
of theorems proven by an axiom system α , via a conventional (unenriched) version
of semantic tableau deduction, is identical to those theorems proven by a Z-enriched
deductive mechanism. Yet despite this invariance, the proof-lengths change, quite
sharply, under the Z-enriched formalisms of Defintions 7.1 and 7.2. This extreme
change in proof-length causes the deployment of an “I am consistent” axiom to be-
come fully infeasible when Υ in Line (9) is allowed to represent any arbitrary Π∗2
sentence (see footnote 7 ).
8 Further Generalizations
For the sake of simplicity, the previous sections had focused on the semantic tableau
deductive apparatus. However, it is known [15] that resolution shares numerous
characteristics with tableau. Therefore, it turns out that Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 do
generalize when resolution replaces semantic tableau.
In particular, let us say a theorem T has a Res−proof from α ’s set of proper
axioms when there is a resolution-based proof [15] of T from α . Also, the term
Xres−proof of T refers to the obvious extension of a Res−proof that allows all
instances of the Law of Excluded Middle (from the base language of L∗ ) to appear
as formalized logical axioms.
7The point is that the sharp compression in proof lengths produces Go¨del-like Diagonalization
compressions, similar to those particular Second Incompleteness Effects applicable to Π∗2 sentences,
that are examined in [49].
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It turns out Xres differs from Res in the same manner Xtab differed from Tab.
Thus, the obvious generalizations of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 hold for Res and Xres.
In particular, ISRes( • ) is a consistency preserving transformation, but ISXres( • )
again is not.
Some logicians may, also, wish to examine special speculations in [55]’s arXiv
article. It contemplated an alternative approach, where self-justifying arithmetics
employ an unconventional “indeterminate” functional object, called the Θ primitive,
to formalize the traditional properties of an endless sequence of integers.
If a conjecture stated in [55] is correct (as we are almost certain it is), then such a
self-justifying machine will be plausible for constructing the entire set of natural num-
bers, without encountering the usual incompleteness difficulties that the Theorem ++
(of Pudla´k and Solovay) associated with Type-S formalisms (that recognize merely
Successor as a total function). Interestingly, the θ function primitive of [55] should
allow a substantial Type-NS arithmetic to exist that can simultaneously recognize
its own Hilbert-Frege consistency and possess a formalized ability to constructively
enumerate the full infinite collection of integers 0, 1, 2, 3, ....
9 Ironic Events and Related Speculations:
The initial 19-page draft of this article was accepted by the LFCS-2020 conference and
was published by Springer [57], shortly before the Covid crisis commenced. During
January 4-7, when LFCS met, there was little knowledge 8 about the soon-to-appear
epidemic. The nature of the Covid event did become apparent by March of 2020. At
that time, the ASL changed its previously planned North American Annual Meeting
into a virtual conference (with a virtual presentation of our planned slides being
posted at the ASL’s web site).
This ironic chronology is, perhaps, worth briefly recollecting because of the con-
nection between Theorem 4.4 with the new world of computing that is now, currently,
emerging.
Thus, mankind will likely become increasingly dependent upon computers in the
future. For instance, the spread of a serious epidemic can be more effectively con-
8This is because the Chinese authorities announced the presence of Covid only on December 31.
Their announcement had not yet attracted any attention at the LFCS-2020 conference.
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tained, when staffs at medical facilities are computerized, as much as feasible. (Then
a patient, suffering from a virus, will be less contagious, when virus particles bounce
off sterile computerized robots, instead of encountering vulnerable human staff mem-
bers.) Also, transportation networks and factories processing food-materials will be
safer if they are run by computerized robots, rather than depend upon human beings
(who breathe out air containing dangerous virus contagions).
Our point is that a large variety of forms of Artificial Intelligence will likely be-
come increasingly prominent in the future. Thus, AI-based machines should become
more effective, if their actions are both consistent and display the maximal amount
of awareness about their self-consistency (that is plausible under anticipated future
generalizations of our self-justifying formalism).
It is clear that AI-based computers will exhibit a broad variety of automated
skills, many of which will be only partially related to Theorem 4.4’s self-justifying
ISTab mechanism. (For instance, future AI-machines will, certainly, need automated
skills that master the arts of visual learning, motion planning and several forms
of decision-making.) Nevertheless, a quite fascinating point is that the early 20-th
century predictions of Hilbert and Go¨del, in ∗ and ∗∗, will gain some new positive
interpretations, when they anticipated significant benefits from future generations of
thinking machines being aware about the consistency of, at least, their specialized
restricted forms of mathematical knowledge.
We do not wish to pursue these points further, here, because there will, certainly,
be many other types of unanticipated events, which also advance the need for more
elaborate forms of Artificial Intelligence in the future. These future events should be
consistent with, at least, the broad predictions that Hilbert and Go¨del made in their
famous statements ∗ and ∗∗.
10 Concluding Remarks
Our main results in this article are surprising because it is quite unusual for an
initially consistent formalism α to become inconsistent when its initial schema of
theorems (establishing the widespread validity of the Law of the Excluded Middle) is
transformed into being a schema of logical axioms.
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This unusual effect arose because the meaning of a Group-3 “I am consistent”
axiom changes, quite substantially, when theorems are transformed into logical axioms
(as illustrated by footnote 9 ). Thus, unacceptable diagonalizing contradictions can
occur when an “I am consistent” axiom is able to reference itself in the context of a
SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL mathematical machine.
The contrast between Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 (where only the former eschews diag-
onalization effects) helpfully explains how Hilbert and Go¨del appreciated the Second
Incompleteness Effect, while they were simultaneously cautious about it. Moreover,
Go¨del’s particular remark ∗∗ should not be ignored when comments from Gerald
Sacks and Stanley Tennenbaum [32, 39] recalled how Go¨del reiterated the gist of his
1931-published remark, many years after its printing. Indeed, it is noteworthy Harvey
Friedman recorded a YouTube lecture [18], stating he was also tentatively open to the
possibility that the Second Incompleteness Theorems might allow partial exceptions.
Thus, while there is no doubt that the Second Incompleteness Theorem will be
remembered for its seminal impact, its part-way exceptions are also significant. This
is because futuristic high-tech computers will better understand their self-capacities,
if they own some partial awareness about their own consistency.
There is no page space to delve into all details here. However, the distinction
between the initial “IS(A)” system, from our 1993 and 2001 papers [46, 47], with
the more sophisticated ISTab−1 (β) formalism of our year-2005 article [50] should,
also, be briefly mentioned. Our older “IS(A)” formalism was actually simpler, but
it was substantially weaker because it only recognized the non-existence of a proof
of 0 = 1 from itself. In contrast, ISTab−1 (β)’s Group-3 axiom can corroborate that
no two simultaneous proofs exist for a Rank-1* sentence and its negation. This is
an important distinction, because the First Incompleteness Theorem indicates no
decision procedure exists for separating all true from false Rank-1* sentences. (See
[51, 52, 54, 55] for other particular refinements for our “IS(A)” formalism.)
In summary, the main purpose of this article has been to explore the contrast
between the opposing Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. The latter theorem, thus, provides
another helpful reminder about the millennial importance of Go¨del’s seminal Second
9The point is that proofs are compressed when theorems are transformed into logical axioms, and
such compressions can produce diagonalizing contradictions under some Type-A logics using “I am
consistent” axioms.
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Incompleteness Theorem. Yet at the same time, Theorem 4.4 illustrates how some
partial exceptions to Go¨del’s result do arise, as Hilbert and Go¨del predicted in their
statements ∗ and ∗∗.
In essence, the 2-way contrast between Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 may be as significant
as their individual actual results. This is because the Second Incompleteness Theorem
is fundamental to Logic. Many historians have, thus, been perplexed by the partial
reluctance that Hilbert and Go¨del had expressed about it in ∗ and ∗∗. A partial reason
for this reluctance is, perhaps, related to the contrast between these two opposing
theorems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: I thank Seth Chaiken and James P. Torre, IV for
several quite helpful comments about how to improve the presentation.
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Appendix providing a formal definition for a Se-
mantic Tableau proof:
Our definition of a semantic tableau proof is similar to analogs from the textbooks
by Fitting and Smullyan [15, 40]. A tableau proof of a theorem Ψ from a set of
proper axioms (denoted as α ) is therefore a tree structure, whose root contains
the temporary contradictory assumption of ¬Ψ and whose every descending root-
to-leaf branch affirms a contradiction by containing both some sentence φ and its
negation ¬φ. Each internal node in this tree will be either a proper axiom of α or a
deduction from a higher ancestor in this tree via one of six elimination rules for the
logical connective symbols of ∧ , ∨ , → , ¬ , ∀ and ∃ . (These rules use a
notation where “A =⇒ B ” is an abbreviation for a sentence B being an allowed
deduction from its ancestor of A .)
1. Υ ∧ Γ =⇒ Υ and Υ ∧ Γ =⇒ Γ .
2. ¬¬Υ =⇒ Υ. Other rules for the “¬ ” symbol are: ¬(Υ ∨ Γ) =⇒ ¬Υ ∧ ¬Γ,
¬(Υ→ Γ) =⇒ Υ∧¬Γ , ¬(Υ∧Γ) =⇒ ¬Υ∨¬Γ , ¬∃vΥ(v) =⇒ ∀v¬Υ(v)
and ¬∀vΥ(v) =⇒ ∃v¬Υ(v)
3. A pair of sibling nodes Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ ∨ Γ.
4. A pair of sibling nodes ¬Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ → Γ.
5. ∀vΥ(v) =⇒ Υ(t) where t may denote any term.
6. ∃vΥ(v) =⇒ Υ(p) where p is a newly introduced parameter symbol.
One minor difference in notation is we treat “ ∀ v ≤ s Φ(v) ” as an abbreviation
for ∀v { v ≤ s → Φ(v) } and “ ∃ v ≤ s Φ(v) ” as an abbreviation for
∃v { v ≤ s ∧ Φ(v) } . Therefore, Rules 5 and 6 imply the following hybrid rules
for processing bounded universal and bounded existential quantifiers:
a. ∀v ≤ sΥ(v) =⇒ t ≤ s → Υ(t) where t may be any arithmetic term.
b. ∃v ≤ s Υ(v) =⇒ p ≤ s ∧ Υ(p) where p is a new parameter symbol.
Added Comment: The preceding paragraph has formalized what §4 called the
“Tab” version of a semantic tableau proof. Its “Xtab” variant is identical except that
any node may optionally store a sentence of the form ℧ ∨ ¬℧ (for arbitrary ℧ ),
as a manifestation of its allowed use of the Law of the Excluded Middle.
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